NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) — Great. The global economy finally starts to show signs of emerging from the recession and now a possible trade war between the U.S. and China is throwing a monkey wrench into the recovery.

The U.S. just slapped a 35% tariff on tires imported from China, beginning Sept. 26.

And in a move that doesn’t look like mere coincidence, the Chinese government announced Sunday that it is launching a probe into possibility of the U.S. dumping auto parts and chickens on the Chinese market.

This is not good news. This spat could have a major impact on more than just Goodyear Tire & Rubber (GT, Fortune 500), Cooper Tire & Rubber (CTB) and poultry producer Tyson Foods (TSN, Fortune 500).

If the tension between the U.S. and China escalates into a full-blown bout of global protectionism, we might need to kiss the notion of an economic recovery goodbye. This could be the start of that much-feared double dip into another recession.

Or as Michael Corleone said in an often parodied line from the “The Godfather: Part III”: “Just when I thought I was out … they pull me back in!”

On the one hand, it makes sense for the White House to try and enforce existing trade laws so that U.S. tire makers can compete more effectively with cheaper tires imported from China.

The trade deficit with China has soared in recent years, hitting a record high in 2008. This is a concern for obvious reasons: If we continue to buy a lot more from China than we sell to them, more U.S.-based manufacturing jobs could be lost.

“It’s not uncommon for the government to side with certain industries to protect American workers,” said Keith Hembre, chief economist with First American Funds in Minneapolis. “These tariffs wouldn’t be happening if the unemployment rate was substantially lower.”

But we’ve been down this road before. The launching of tariffs during a severe economic slowdown has done more than harm than good in the past.

Many historians blame the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised tariffs to their highest levels ever, for making the Great Depression worse.

Protectionism is a bad idea. In this increasingly globalized economy, it just doesn’t make sense to alienate trading partners.

“One would hope we can avoid more of this. There is no positive side to raising tariffs,” said Kurt Karl, chief U.S. economist with Swiss Re. “In this global crisis, you want global cooperation. This doesn’t help.”

And that’s especially true with China since it is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury debt, owning about $776 billion of Treasurys as of June.

If the Chinese stopped buying Treasurys — or worse started selling them en masse — it could have a catastrophic effect on the dollar and the nation’s fiscal state as a whole.

“A trade war would be very detrimental to the U.S. and the global economy,” said Michael Pento, chief economist with Delta Global Advisors, Inc., a money management firm. “We should have fair, open trade. But our banker right now is the Chinese, and it’s best not to bite your banker’s hand.”

Karl isn’t too concerned that China would dump Treasurys. He argues that would be the equivalent of China shooting itself in the foot since it would further erode the value of its holdings.

Nonetheless, Karl does worry that China could retaliate against the tire tariff with tariffs of its own and even more government subsidies of Chinese manufacturers. That could make the trade deficit worse.

But at least one economist thinks cooler heads will eventually prevail and that the brouhaha over tires won’t lead to the China and U.S. levying more tariffs on other goods.

Michael Strauss, chief economist with Commonfund, a money management firm based in Wilton, Conn. said there is not going to be a repeat of the mistakes of Smoot-Hawley.

Strauss said both the U.S. and Chinese are smart enough students of economic history to know that the last thing the world needs now is for arguably the two most important economic powers to turn a spat over tires and chickens into something that could derail a global rebound.

“This is not that big of a deal. You get these battles once in a while and they pass. This is not reminiscent of what happened 80 years ago,” he said. “Deep down, the U.S. and China know that they need one another. There’s going to be more negotiation than retaliation.”

Here’s hoping that he’s right.

Talkback: Would a trade war between the U.S. and China be a bad thing? Or should the U.S. be more protectionist to try and save jobs? Share your comments below.

WASHINGTON — In March 2005, a low-key Princeton economist who had become a Federal Reserve governor coined a novel theory to explain the growing tendency of Americans to borrow from foreigners, particularly the Chinese, to finance their heavy spending.

American trade and budget deficits have grown worse and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr., with President Hu Jintao of China, has not been able to allay the problem.

The problem, he said, was not that Americans spend too much, but that foreigners save too much. The Chinese have piled up so much excess savings that they lend money to the United States at low rates, underwriting American consumption.

This colossal credit cycle could not last forever, he said. But in a global economy, the transfer of Chinese money to America was a market phenomenon that would take years, even a decade, to work itself out. For now, he said, “we probably have little choice except to be patient.”

Today, the dependence of the United States on Chinese money looks less benign. And the economist who proposed the theory, Ben S. Bernanke, is dealing with the consequences, having been promoted to chairman of the Fed in 2006, as these cross-border money flows were reaching stratospheric levels.

In the past decade, China has invested upward of $1 trillion, mostly earnings from manufacturing exports, into American government bonds and government-backed mortgage debt. That has lowered interest rates and helped fuel a historic consumption binge and housing bubble in the United States.

China, some economists say, lulled American consumers, and their leaders, into complacency about their spendthrift ways.

“This was a blinking red light,” said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard and a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. “We should have reacted to it.”

In hindsight, many economists say, the United States should have recognized that borrowing from abroad for consumption and deficit spending at home was not a formula for economic success. Even as that weakness is becoming more widely recognized, however, the United States is likely to be more addicted than ever to foreign creditors to finance record government spending to revive the broken economy.

To be sure, there were few ready remedies. Some critics argue that the United States could have pushed Beijing harder to abandon its policy of keeping the value of its currency weak — a policy that made its exports less expensive and helped turn it into the world’s leading manufacturing power. If China had allowed its currency to float according to market demand in the past decade, its export growth probably would have moderated. And it would not have acquired the same vast hoard of dollars to invest abroad.

Others say the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department should have seen the Chinese lending for what it was: a giant stimulus to the American economy, not unlike interest rate cuts by the Fed. These critics say the Fed under Alan Greenspan contributed to the creation of the housing bubble by leaving interest rates too low for too long, even as Chinese investment further stoked an easy-money economy. The Fed should have cut interest rates less in the middle of this decade, they say, and started raising them sooner, to help reduce speculation in real estate.

Today, with the wreckage around him, Mr. Bernanke said he regretted that more was not done to regulate financial institutions and mortgage providers, which might have prevented the flood of investment, including that from China, from being so badly used. But the Fed’s role in regulation is limited to banks. And stricter regulation by itself would not have been enough, he insisted.

“Achieving a better balance of international capital flows early on could have significantly reduced the risks to the financial system,” Mr. Bernanke said in an interview in his office overlooking the Washington Mall.

“However,” he continued, “this could only have been done through international cooperation, not by the United States alone. The problem was recognized, but sufficient international cooperation was not forthcoming.”

The inaction was because of a range of factors, political and economic. By the yardsticks that appeared to matter most — prosperity and growth — the relationship between China and the United States also seemed to be paying off for both countries. Neither had a strong incentive to break an addiction: China to strong export growth and financial stability; the United States to cheap imports and low-cost foreign loans.

In Washington, China was treated as a threat by some people, but mostly because it lured away manufacturing jobs. Others argued that China’s heavy lending to this country was risky because Chinese leaders could decide to withdraw money at a moment’s notice, creating a panicky run on the dollar.

Mr. Bernanke viewed such international investment flows through a different lens. He argued that Chinese invested savings abroad because consumers in China did not have enough confidence to spend. Changing that situation would take years, and did not amount to a pressing problem for the Americans.  “The global savings glut story did us a collective disservice,” said Edwin M. Truman, a former Fed and Treasury official. “It created the idea that the world was doing it to us and we couldn’t do anything about it.”

But Mr. Bernanke’s theory fit the prevailing hands-off, pro-market ideology of recent years. Mr. Greenspan and the Bush administration treated the record American trade deficit and heavy foreign borrowing as an abstract threat, not an urgent problem.

Mr. Bernanke, after he took charge of the Fed, warned that the imbalances between the countries were growing more serious. By then, however, it was too late to do much about them. And the White House still regarded imbalances as an arcane subject best left to economists.

By itself, money from China is not a bad thing. As American officials like to note, it speaks to the attractiveness of the United States as a destination for foreign investment. In the 19th century, the United States built its railroads with capital borrowed from the British.

In the past decade, China arguably enabled an American boom. Low-cost Chinese goods helped keep a lid on inflation, while the flood of Chinese investment helped the government finance mortgages and a public debt of close to $11 trillion.

But Americans did not use the lower-cost money afforded by Chinese investment to build a 21st-century equivalent of the railroads. Instead, the government engaged in a costly war in Iraq, and consumers used loose credit to buy sport utility vehicles and larger homes. Banks and investors, eagerly seeking higher interest rates in this easy-money environment, created risky new securities like collateralized debt obligations.

“Nobody wanted to get off this drug,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican who pushed legislation to punish China by imposing stiff tariffs. “Their drug was an endless line of customers for made-in-China products. Our drug was the Chinese products and cash.”

Mr. Graham said he understood the addiction: he was speaking by phone from a Wal-Mart store in Anderson, S.C., where he was Christmas shopping in aisles lined with items from China.

A New Economic Dance

The United States has been here before. In the 1980s, it ran heavy trade deficits with Japan, which recycled some of its trading profits into American government bonds.

At that time, the deficits were viewed as a grave threat to America’s economic might. Action took the form of a 1985 agreement known as the Plaza Accord. The world’s major economies intervened in currency markets to drive down the value of the dollar and drive up the Japanese yen.

The arrangement did slow the growth of the trade deficit for a time. But economists blamed the sharp revaluation of the Japanese yen for halting Japan’s rapid growth. The lesson of the Plaza Accord was not lost on China, which at that time was just emerging as an export power.

China tied itself even more tightly to the United States than did Japan. In 1995, it devalued its currency and set a firm exchange rate of roughly 8.3 to the dollar, a level that remained fixed for a decade.

During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, China clung firmly to its currency policy, earning praise from the Clinton administration for helping check the spiral of devaluation sweeping Asia. Its low wages attracted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment.

By the early part of this decade, the United States was importing huge amounts of Chinese-made goods — toys, shoes, flat-screen televisions and auto parts — while selling much less to China in return.

“For consumers, this was a net benefit because of the availability of cheaper goods,” said Laurence H. Meyer, a former Fed governor. “There’s no question that China put downward pressure on inflation rates.”

But in classical economics, that trade gap could not have persisted for long without bankrupting the American economy. Except that China recycled its trade profits right back into the United States.

It did so to protect its own interests. China kept its banks under tight state control and its currency on a short leash to ensure financial stability. It required companies and individuals to save in the state-run banking system most foreign currency — primarily dollars — that they earned from foreign trade and investment.

As foreign trade surged, this hoard of dollars became enormous. In 2000, the reserves were less than $200 billion; today they are about $2 trillion.

Chinese leaders chose to park the bulk of that in safe securities backed by the American government, including Treasury bonds and the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had implicit government backing.  This not only allowed the United States to continue to finance its trade deficit, but, by creating greater demand for United States securities, it also helped push interest rates below where they would otherwise have been. For years, China’s government was eager to buy American debt at yields many in the private sector felt were too low.

This financial and trade embrace between the United States and China grew so tight that Niall Ferguson, a financial historian, has dubbed the two countries Chimerica.

‘Tiptoeing’ Around a Partner

Being attached at the hip was not entirely comfortable for either side, though for widely differing reasons.

In the United States, more people worried about cheap Chinese goods than cheap Chinese loans. By 2003, China’s trade surplus with the United States was ballooning, and lawmakers in Congress were restive. Senator Graham and Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, introduced a bill threatening to impose a 27 percent duty on Chinese goods.

“We had a moment where we caught everyone’s attention: the White House and China,” Mr. Graham recalled.

At the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, a consensus was also emerging in late 2004: China should break its tight link to the dollar, which would make its exports more expensive. Yu Yongding, a leading economic adviser, pressed the case. The American trade and budget deficits were not sustainable, he warned. China was wrong to keep its currency artificially depressed and depend too much on selling cheap goods.

Proponents of revaluation in China argued that the country’s currency policies denied the fruits of prosperity to Chinese consumers. Beijing was investing their savings in low-yielding American government securities. And with a weak currency, they said, Chinese could not afford many imported goods.

The central bank’s English-speaking governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, was among those who favored a sizable revaluation.

But when Beijing acted to amend its currency policy in 2005, under heavy pressure from Congress and the White House, it moved cautiously. The renminbi was allowed to climb only 2 percent. The Communist Party opted for only incremental adjustments to its economic model after a decade of fast growth. Little changed: China’s exports kept soaring and investment poured into steel mills and garment factories.

But American officials eased the pressure. They decided to put more emphasis on urging Chinese consumers to spend more of their savings, which they hoped would eventually bring the two economies into better balance. On a tour of China, John W. Snow, the Treasury secretary at the time, even urged the Chinese to start using credit cards.

China kicked off its own campaign to encourage domestic consumption, which it hoped would provide a new source. But Chinese save with the same zeal that, until recently, Americans spent. Shorn of the social safety net of the old Communist state, they squirrel away money to pay for hospital visits, housing or retirement. This accounts for the savings glut identified by Mr. Bernanke.

Privately, Chinese officials confided to visiting Americans that the effort was not achieving much.

“It is sometimes hard to change successful models,” said Robert B. Zoellick, who negotiated with the Chinese as a deputy secretary of state. “It is prototypically American to say, ‘This worked well, but now you’ve got to change it.’ ”

In Washington, some critics say too little was done. A former Treasury official, Timothy D. Adams, tried to get the I.M.F. to act as a watchdog for currency manipulation by China, which would have subjected Beijing to more global pressure.

Yet when Mr. Snow was succeeded as Treasury secretary by Henry M. Paulson Jr. in 2006, the I.M.F. was sidelined, according to several officials, and Mr. Paulson took command of China policy.

He was not shy about his credentials. As an investment banker with Goldman Sachs, Mr. Paulson made 70 trips to China. In his office hangs a watercolor depicting the hometown of Zhu Rongji, a forceful former prime minister.

“I pushed very hard on currency because I believed it was important for China to get to a market-determined currency,” Mr. Paulson said in an interview. But he conceded he did not get what he wanted.

In late 2006, Mr. Paulson invited Mr. Bernanke to accompany him to Beijing. Mr. Bernanke used the occasion to deliver a blunt speech to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in which he advised the Chinese to reorient their economy and revalue their currency.

At the last minute, however, Mr. Bernanke deleted a reference to the exchange rate being an “effective subsidy” for Chinese exports, out of fear that it could be used as a pretext for a trade lawsuit against China.

Critics detected a pattern. They noted that in its twice-yearly reports to Congress about trading partners, the Treasury Department had never branded China a currency manipulator.

“We’re tiptoeing around, desperately trying not to irritate or offend the Chinese,” said Thea M. Lee, public policy director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. “But to get concrete results, you have to be confrontational.”

An Embrace That Won’t Let Go

For China, too, this crisis has been a time of reckoning. Americans are buying fewer Chinese DVD players and microwave ovens. Trade is collapsing, and thousands of workers are losing their jobs. Chinese leaders are terrified of social unrest.

Having allowed the renminbi to rise a little after 2005, the Chinese government is now under intense pressure domestically to reverse course and depreciate it. China’s fortunes remain tethered to those of the United States. And the reverse is equally true.

In a glassed-in room in a nondescript office building in Washington, the Treasury conducts nearly daily auctions of billions of dollars’ worth of government bonds. An old Army helmet sits on a shelf: as a lark, Treasury officials have been known to strap it on while they monitor incoming bids.

For the past five years, China has been one of the most prolific bidders. It holds $652 billion in Treasury debt, up from $459 billion a year ago. Add in its Fannie Mae bonds and other holdings, and analysts figure China owns $1 of every $10 of America’s public debt.

The Treasury is conducting more auctions than ever to finance its $700 billion bailout of the banks. Still more will be needed to pay for the incoming Obama administration’s stimulus package. The United States, economists say, will depend on the Chinese to keep buying that debt, perpetuating the American habit.

Even so, Mr. Paulson said he viewed the debate over global imbalances as hopelessly academic. He expressed doubt that Mr. Bernanke or anyone else could have solved the problem as it was germinating.

“One lesson that I have clearly learned,” said Mr. Paulson, sitting beneath his Chinese watercolor. “You don’t get dramatic change, or reform, or action unless there is a crisis.”

A large television screen operated by Focus Media broadcasts advertisements to passing traffic at a shopping mall in Beijing.

The deal, which was announced late Monday in Shanghai, pushes Sina, which controls Sina.com, into the business of outdoor and in-store advertising on liquid-crystal display monitors, diversifying an Internet giant that evolved as a kind of Chinese version of Yahoo, with news, blogs and online entertainment.

The deal also breaks up or substantially alters Focus Media, a company based in Shanghai that just over a year ago was one of China’s high-flying advertising companies, valued then at more than $7 billion, after a successful listing on Nasdaq a few years earlier.

Both companies are now struggling to deal with fierce competition in China and an advertising slowdown that is expected to accelerate further in 2009.

Shares of the two companies, both of which trade on Nasdaq, fell sharply on the news Monday, apparently over worries that Sina was paying a high price for the assets and that Focus Media was going to change its focus because of the sale.

Shares of Sina were down 17 percent, to $24.25, late Monday. And shares of Focus Media, which have fallen from about $60 a year ago, were down 16 percent in late trading Monday, to $9.20.

The companies said that the boards of both companies had already approved the asset sale and that no shareholder vote was necessary. Sina will issue about 47 million shares to Focus Media shareholders to acquire the assets.

According to the deal, Sina is expected to acquire most of the core holdings of Focus Media, including its out-of-home advertising networks, its LCD display network, and its in-store network, which together would amount to more than 100,000 advertising monitors around the country.

Those assets accounted for about 52 percent of Focus Media’s revenue and 73 percent of its profit through the first nine months of this year, the company said.

Focus Media, which is expected to have about $800 million in revenue this year, said it would retain its fast-growing online advertising assets, its movie advertising network, its commercial location networks and its traditional billboard business.

Sina, whose revenues are estimated to be close to $360 million this year, called the deal a merger of great properties.

“The transaction is intended to combine the forces of two of the most powerful new-media advertising platforms in China,” Charles Chao, Sina’s chief executive, said in a statement.

Executives at Sina and Focus Media are familiar with each other. Since 2005, Mr. Chao of Sina has served on the board of Focus Media, alongside that company’s founder and chairman, Jason Jiang.

While Sina.com competes fiercely against other strong Chinese Internet companies, like Baidu, Sohu and Tencent, analysts have considered Focus Media an innovative company because it has grown fast, essentially by acquiring competitors and placing monitors in stores, residential buildings and even on busy commercial streets in some of China’s biggest cities, including Shanghai.

The monitors recycle short television advertising spots produced by a wide variety of brands, including global companies like Nike and Apple.

Focus Media was founded in Shanghai by Mr. Jiang, who has been listed by Forbes for several years as one of China’s wealthiest entrepreneurs.

Chinese soldiers listened to President Hu Jintao on Thursday in Beijing, on the 30th anniversary of the start of economic reforms.

SHENZHEN, China — The ruling Communist Party threw itself a big party on Thursday. The country’s leadership marked the 30th anniversary of the reform era that transformed China into a global economic power and, in doing so, changed the world.

At a triumphant ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, President Hu Jintao invoked Deng Xiaoping, who consolidated power in 1978 and began “reform and opening.” Mr. Hu emphasized the party’s unwavering focus on economic development. “Only development makes sense,” said Mr. Hu, quoting Deng.

But beyond the oratory, Mr. Hu and other Chinese leaders are now facing a new era in which Deng’s export-led economic model, as well as his iron-fisted political control, face unprecedented challenges. Global demand for Chinese goods has slumped, unrest is on the rise in the industrial heartland, and China is scrambling for a new formula to preserve stability and ensure growth.

The downturn is so swift — exports fell last month for the first time in seven years — that Beijing is being forced to abruptly shift priorities. Until recently, Mr. Hu had been trying to curb excesses like rampant pollution and income inequality that posed environmental and social challenges to long-term development. Now, those priorities seem eclipsed.

Instead, leaders are restoring tax breaks for exporters and pushing down the value of China’s currency to encourage exports. At the same time, they are casting about for ways to spur domestic demand and wean China’s economy off its dependence on foreign markets swept up in the global financial crisis.

Politically, Chinese reformers had hoped the symbolic weight of the anniversary and the nation’s post-Olympic glow might propel some measure of political reform to address official corruption and help defuse rising social tensions.

But as Beijing worries about strikes and mass layoffs even in some of its most prosperous areas, official tolerance of political dissent has seemingly narrowed. This month, a prominent dissident was detained after writing an open letter calling for greater democracy. An editor at one of the country’s leading newspapers was reassigned after publishing articles deemed too politically provocative. “We must draw on the benefits of humankind’s political civilization,” Mr. Hu said in his Thursday speech, according to Reuters. “But we will never copy the model of the Western political system.”

If any place symbolizes China’s reform era, it is Shenzhen, a city conceived from Deng’s imagination — and one now in the cross hairs of the economic downturn. Thursday’s celebration was timed to a 1978 political meeting, the Third Plenum, which anointed Deng as China’s leader and introduced “reform and opening.” Two years later, Deng pointed at a sleepy fishing village in coastal southern China, near Hong Kong, and ordained it the country’s first “special economic zone” to experiment with foreign investment and export manufacturing. Today, Shenzhen is a city of more than 10 million people ringed by thousands of factories.

A factory district just outside Shenzhen, Fuqiao Industrial Park, is a snapshot of the economic troubles rippling through the region. Several small factories in the park have closed in recent months. At Wang Jinda Industries, the lettering had been scraped off the entrance after the owner closed last week. Two customers had arrived for a shipment of goods only to find an empty factory.

Meanwhile, some factories that remained open were struggling. Workers at a large printing factory said the owners had stopped recruiting new workers in September while many others had quit. Several workers said wages had dropped significantly as the owners were reducing the length of shifts. A few workers accused owners of deliberately trying to drive down wages to force workers to quit. “Everybody is worried,” said Lin Baozeng, 26, a cashier at a canteen inside the industrial park. Her daily lunch crowd has dwindled to about 100 migrant workers from 500.

“If the economy is bad,” Ms. Lin added as her 3-year-old daughter played nearby, “how can I afford to raise my child?”

As yet, gauging the scale of factory closings remains difficult in Shenzhen and surrounding Guangdong Province, the country’s main export engine. Guangdong was already making a concerted effort to move up the manufacturing value chain at a time when rising labor costs and greater government regulations were making some smaller, cheaper exporters unprofitable. But the recent export slowdown is having an unanticipated impact. More than 7,000 small- and medium-sized factories have closed in recent months. Shenzhen’s mayor said 50,000 people in the city alone had lost their jobs in the last few months.  And there are mounting signs that the problems could be far broader. Over all, China’s economy will continue to expand next year, but some economists say the rate of growth could fall as low as 5 or 6 percent, far slower than the double-digit pace of the preceding several years.

State media have reported that 4.85 million migrant workers have returned to the countryside early before next month’s annual Lunar New Year holiday. Some inland provinces have already announced subsidies for unemployed returnees. On Thursday, the country’s official news agency, Xinhua, reported that 6.5 million migrant workers may be jobless next year.

Beijing has recently restored some export subsidies that had been repealed as part of earlier efforts to rebalance the economy toward domestic demand. Huang Yasheng, a management professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said such subsidies made short-term political sense, given the huge numbers of jobs provided by factories, but did not address China’s long-term economic challenges. “I see the export supports as a crisis measure,” Mr. Huang said. “They really have no other way to maintain employment.”

Mr. Huang said the government’s focus on exports and expanding the role of state-owned corporations since the 1990s had meant too little of the country’s wealth had trickled down to ordinary people. He said household incomes had lagged well behind overall growth, meaning that hundreds of millions of ordinary people still had relatively little spending money — a major problem when the government is trying to rapidly increase domestic consumption. “It’s a huge challenge,” said Mr. Huang, author of a recent book, “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.”

China’s immediate answer is a stimulus program focused on infrastructure like railways and ports. State-owned banks are being ordered to make credit easily available, and business taxes on real estate sales were waived this week. Such steps may be crucial to buttressing the Chinese economy and preventing a deeper global recession. Yet some Chinese officials are wary of the potential impact of another phase of state-led industrial development.

The government stimulus program enacted in response to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis enabled China to avoid the recessions suffered by neighboring nations. Yet it also propelled the enormous investment in heavy industry that is a major reason China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.

In an opinion article in the online edition of People’s Daily, Pan Yue, the outspoken vice minister of the Ministry of Environment, blamed Western excess for the global crisis and warned that China risked ruin if it blindly pursued Western industrial models.

“China’s reform and opening has achieved in 30 years the economic gains of more than 100 years in the West — yet more than 100 years of environmental pollution in the West have materialized in 30 years in China,” Mr. Pan wrote. “The present global economic crisis shows that if China continues down the old road of Western industrial civilization, it will only come to a dead end.”

China is a far more open and dynamic place than the country Deng first unleashed three decades ago. Much of that change has come from ordinary people pushing for more space in society, just as much of China’s economic success has come from the entrepreneurial energy and hard work of its work force. Yet Communist Party leaders have been careful to hoard political power: independent unions and political opposition remain illegal.

Earlier this year, Shenzhen’s leaders seemed eager to position the city as a pioneer of political reform. Shenzhen officials published a reform plan that advocated some local elections and greater leeway for local legislatures and courts to make decisions. But those plans, later tempered by provincial leaders, now seem derailed as officials are focused on maintaining social stability.

Some influential Chinese say more should be done. Yu Keping, a scholar at a leading Communist Party research institute who has advised top leaders, published essays this week in leading Chinese newspapers about the need for greater democratization to combat corruption.

In an interview with The New York Times, Mr. Yu called for “breakthrough reform.” But he also said that change must come incrementally, given the need for social stability, with an initial emphasis on better governing and rule of law. “We need to promote democratization in China,” Mr. Yu said. “On the other hand, we need to promote social stability. If we had an election right now, we might end up like Thailand.”

In fact, the limited momentum toward modest political change could well be sidelined by economic problems, some experts say. “A real huge question is how the economic downturn is going to affect any sort of political reform,” said Joseph Fewsmith, a Boston University professor who studies Chinese politics. He said officials might deliberately slow efforts to carry out a new rural land reform law approved this fall to grant farmers the ability to transfer their land rights.

“People worried about social stability are going to proceed very, very slowly,” Mr. Fewsmith said.